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PREFACE 
Why s tudy  t h e  hunger problem? I t  is one known t o  most peo- 
ple; a remote problem brought devastatingly close when t h e  
media focus on t h e  la tes t  famine o r  drought. The causes seem 
t o  pers is t ,  desp i t e  ef for ts  in r i c h e r  countr ies  t o  provide food 
and o t h e r  aid. 
(1) What can a s tudy l ike t h e  Food and Agriculture Program 
(FAP) a t  t h e  International Ins t i tu te  f o r  Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) do t o  help r educe  hunger? 
(2) Why d o  hunger and large food surpluses exis t  con- 
current ly?  
(3) What prevents  t h e  redistribution of surplus  food t o  t h e  
hungry? 
(4) Can we identify policies t o  eradica te  hunger in our  time? 
Those who initiated and suppor ted  t h e  FAP w e r e  
motivated b y  a des i re  t o  answer t h e  above questions, and t o  
solve t h e  moral and economic issues raised b y  them. If i t  is 
found possible t o  eradica te  hunger through sensible manage- 
ment of resources ,  then  t h e  case  is c l ea r  fo r  immediate humani- 
tar ian action b y  all concerned,  and part icularly s o  if i t  can  b e  
achieved a t  reasonable cost .  
Why was th i s  s tudy  under taken a t  IIASA? 
(1.) Althougfi hunger as a problem is regiorlally confined, the 
growing interdependence of the global food system 
requires an in ternat ional appr-oach. 
(2) Economic relations and policies are  complex and require 
the development of new arialytical tools. 
(3) The problem requires a multidisciplinar-y approach as it 
covers a number of different, fields, from socioeconomic to 
agrobiological. 
A survey in 1976 showed t,t~at no other study of t h i s  
nature had been undertaken and that there was widespread 
interest in a comprehensive solutiorr to the food problem. Thc: 
study also suited IIASA's aspirations to contribute to the 
advancement of science ar~d mankind's abili ty  t.o deal with 
problems of international importance. 
When the project began in 1!376, the global food crisis of 
1973-1974 and the World Food Conference of 1974 were vivid 
and immediate in people's memories. Today, food si~rpluses 
have grown and worldwide scarcity appears a thing of the past: 
but hunger persists. Despite the remarkable growth of thr: 
international food trade, the promise of 3.974 has not been 
kept: that in ten years no hr~mar~ beirig will  want for. food. Al l  
the more reason for undertaking this study. 
Tn the past ten years it has beer] comrr~only acceptc:d l.hat.: 
(1) Increasing food production in food-deficit countries is 
inadequate as a means of reducir~g hunger. Mcnsures are 
needed to promote consrlmption by deprived groups. 
(2) The hunger problem is rlot one of starvation alone, but of 
chronic undernu trition among diverse groups that share 
one characteri.stic - povert.y 
Realization of these facts renders this study even more 
relevant. For it is based on an analytical t,ool that is capable of 
evaluating production and consrlmption policies, and assessing 
costs and benefits of alternative policies t,o count,ric:s and 
groups within countries. 
A study such as this is not, in the first placc, set  rlp t,o 
derive detailed prescriptive policy scenarios, but is concer.ned 
primarily with ti better r~ndsrst~anding of thc effectiver~ess of 
various policy instruments. The presentation follows these 
lines and demonstrates the consequences of alternative policies 
without judging their political feasibility. This is deemed 
appropriate, in particular, because in the actual policy debate 
a large role is played by fears of the consequences of policy 
changes and their costs, which stifle the decision-making pro- 
cess. By estimating these consequences as objectively as possi- 
ble, even for rather radical policy changes, some of these fears 
may, in fact, be allayed and the actual decision-making process 
facilitated. 
Kirit Parikh 
Wouter Tims 
Food and Agriculture Program, 
International Institute for 
Applied Sys tems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Food and Agriculture Program (FAP) of the International 
Institute for Applied Sys tems Analysis (IIASA), initiated in 
1976, is a large international collaborative research endeavor 
that has involved more than 200 person-years of effort at 
IIASA and its network of collaborating institutions. The main 
focus has been to explore policy options at  national and inter- 
national levels that deal with the problem of chronic hunger. 
For this increasingly interdependent world, policies for trade 
and capital flows were given special emphasis. The results are 
based on analyses with the help of a global modeling system, 
which consists of national (policy analysis) models linked 
through trade and capital transfers. The systems-analytic, 
quantitative, general equilibrium, and empirical approaches of 
the model make it a unique tool for policy analysis and provides 
results that can be examined from a variety of objective cri- 
teria. The main findings of the study are briefly summarized 
first. 
For a complex analysis, like the one repor.ted here, the main 
results cannot be summed up in a few lines. Some of the 
highlights are: 
(I) Current national and int,ernat.ional economic: policies will 
not lead to significant alleviation of hunger and poverty, 
even if the world economy exhibits strstained growth over 
the coming decades. In fact, they will leave a large 
number of people still suffering from chronic hunger by 
the end of the century. 
(2) There are policy alterr~atives for developing countries 
that reduce hunger faster, but these either retard over-all 
economic growth or require substantially larger external 
aid flows. Without such aid, progress in I-educing hunger 
will remain small, even if the gover.nments of poor coun- 
tries were to give priority to meeting food needs. 
(3) More liberal agr*icultural trade policies by developetl 
market-econom y countries alone are of only marginal sig- 
nificance to the hunger pr-oblem and have mixed effects 
on developing countries, increasing hunger in many food- 
importing developing countries. 
(4) More liberal agricultur.al trade policies by the developing 
countries themselves will reduce hilnger. marginally, but 
harm the economies of some of those developing countries 
that export agricultural products. 
(5) Liberalized international movements of labor could dras  ti- 
cally reduce hunger, but this is obviously not a realistic 
alternative in today's world. High-income countries main- 
tain higher wages by restricting labor movement, so t h e  
poor countries have a lower wage r a t e  than would prevail 
were labor services t o  be  freely traded in t he  world. This 
provides an argument for aid flows to  compensate for  re- 
striction of the  free t rade of labor services. 
(6) Additional aid from the  developed countries to finance 
domestic redistributive programs in poor developing coun- 
tr ies can virtually eradicate hunger by t he  end of this 
century.  The additional aid flows will not be  a net  loss to  
t h e  developed countries if, a t  the  same time, all market 
economies liberalize their  agricultliral trade.  This is 
because liberal t rade in agricultural commodities gen- 
e ra tes  adequate economic gains for t h e  developed coun- 
t r ies  t o  finance t he  needed aid flows. In fact ,  these gains 
a r e  also enough to  compensate those farmers in t he  
developed countries whose incomes will decline due to  
liberalization of agricultural trade.  Liberalization of agri- 
cultural trade without additional aid t o  poor countries 
does not generate a s  much additional income for t he  
industrial economies as  is generated with additional aid; if 
anything, i t  increases t h e  level of hunger in t he  world. 
These findings a r e  robust and can b e  supported by 
detailed results of t h e  study. They a r e  pessimistic in t he  
sense tha t  t he  required policy changes, though not radical, a r e  
nevertheless difficult t o  obtain. They a r e  optimistic in their  
conclusion that  hunger can be  eradicated. Contrary t o  t he  
common view of policymakers, t h e  costs of t h e  proposed poli- 
cies a r e  small o r  even negligible. These findings a r e  described 
in greater  detail below and in t h e  t h r ee  books Toward f iee  
Trade in Agr icu l ture ;  Hunger: Beyond the Reach of the 
Invis ib le  Hand; and Linked National Models: A Tool for Inter-  
n a t i o n a l  Fblicy A n a l y s i s  (see Chapter 13, this  report).  How- 
ever ,  for  expository reasons they a r e  not dealt with in the  
same sequence a s  above. 
HUNGER AND ECONOMIC POLICiES 
The system of models used in this study is designed to reflect 
the major structural character of the  world food system. Food 
and agricultural policies are  mostly national policies initiated 
and pursued for domestic purposes. In most industrial coun- 
tries their objective is to achieve some degree of parity 
between agricultural and nonagricultural incomes. A s  their 
farming sectors are  relatively small and the  overall income lev- 
els high, the costs of farm-income policies can be charged to 
domestic consumers and/or taxpayers. In developing countries 
balance-of-payments constraints suggest a drive to self- 
sufficiency. However, their limited scope for raising tax reve- 
nues from a small tax base and the  desire to  keep urban food 
prices low often leads to unfavorable prices for agricultural 
producers. This, in turn, restrains food production and 
increases the need for food imports. 
The import needs of some developing countries coincide 
with the  need of certain developed countries to  export sur- 
pluses - surpluses that a re  a consequence of high domestic 
producer prices and often result in subsidized exports. These 
subsidized exports compete with agricultural exports from 
land-rich developed countries, which need to  m e e t  farm-income 
objectives at  the  smallest cost to their governments. The 
consequence is an increasing tension between competing food- 
exporting developed countries. Food-importing developing 
countries a re  exposed t o  the resulting prices on the 
Box 1 
THE BLS OF NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL POL,ICY MODELS 
USED l?Y FAP AT IIASA 
The national models of t h e  BLS each  c o v e r  t h e  economy of a n  
individual country  or a group of countr ies ;  these  models 
t o g e t h e r  c o v e r  t h e  world economy. Of these  models, 18 
r e p r e s e n t  individual nations and t w o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  EC and t h e  
CMEA. These 20 models [I] a r e  specified in detai l  and t r a c e  
in teract ions  in t h e  behavior  of producers, consumers, and 
governments.  Together  they r e p r e s e n t  abou t  80% of t h e  
world's populat.ion, agr icul tura l  production and t r a d e ,  a r ~ d  food 
consumption. The remaining 20% is cover-ed by 1 4  somowtlat sim- 
plified country-group models. These models, l i r~ked t,hrougti 
international  t r a d e  and capi ta l  flows, consti tute t h e  B L S .  
The system uses a n  empirical  genera l  equilibreium 
approach ,  based on a ten-commodity classif ication [2], cal i-  
b r a t e d  according t o  p a s t  t r ends ,  and specifically designed f o r  
policy analyses with multiple objectives and simultaneous 
changes  in a number of policies by onc: or mor-e c:ountries. It. is 
thus  a tool f o r  studying t h e  impact of policy changes  on t h e  
in ternal  food s i tuat ior~ of a country ,  as well as t h e i r  r epe rcus -  
sions in o t h e r  nations. In i t s  c lass ,  t h e  model i s  among t h e  n ~ o s t  
advanced cur ren t ly  available,  and is  unique in being empiriaally 
estimated. 
Many var iables  are endogenously calculat.ed: at the  in ter -  
national level these  a r e  world marke t  p r i ces ,  n e t  t r a d e  flows, 
and in ternat ional  t r a n s f e r s ;  at t h e  national level these  a r c  
production,  human consumption, feed and  intermediate consump- 
tion, s tock  changes,  investment, and input use, as well as p r i c e s  
and o t h e r  policy instruments. Population, l abor  f o r c e ,  and t h e  
savings r a t e  are exogenously specified.  
BLS e n s u r e s  a consistent  outcome in a number of ways, 
which i s  important  but not  normally realized in o t h e r  analytical  
approaches .  Not only i s  t h e r e  consistency among physical flows 
of commodities, but  a l so  consistenc:y in t h e  financial accounts  of 
economic agen t s  i s  ensured:  
(1) Quanti t ies produced,  demanded, and t r a d e d  balance at 
national and global levels. 
(cont .  ) 
BOX 1 (cont . )  
(2) For consumers and nations, expenditures and incomes bal- 
ance. 
(3) Income earned i s  consistent with income generated by pro- 
duction and trade. 
(4) Pr ices  for producers,  consumers, and government taxes  
are consistent. 
(5) Government expenditures balance inflows. 
(6) Balance of t rade  i s  realized at national and global levels. 
These consistencies and the  global coverage ensure tha t  
secondary effects and adjustments, which may be  quite impor- 
tant ,  are accounted for.  
Yet, like- all  models, i t  is still a crude approximation of 
reali ty.  Nonetheless, the BLS remains a tool of considerable 
potential, worth exploring and extending in t he  years  ahead. It  
can form the basis for much fu r the r  work. 
Notes 
[I] These are for Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil. 
Canada, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Mex- 
ico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan. Thailand, Turkey, 
USA, and t w o  models f o r  integrated regions: the CMEA and 
the  EC. 
[2] These consist of nine agricultural commodities - wheat, 
r ice ,  coarse grains,  bovine and ovine meat, dairy pro- 
ducts, o the r  animal products, protein feeds, o the r  foods, 
and nonfood agricultural products - and one category 
called nonagriculture. 
international market,  which may dis tor t  the i r  own economic 
policies, harming t h e i r  agriculturists.  
Do t h e  chronically hungry benefit  from t h e  situation? 
Increasingly, t h e y  a r e  seen  t o  b e  closely linked with t h e  par- 
ticular food and labor market  conditions of t h e i r  country,  and 
subject  t o  t h e  impact made on the i r  societies by  changing tech- 
nologies. A large segment of t h e  undernourished is engaged in 
t h e  production of food. How t h e y  a r e  af fec ted  by  competition 
among food exporters on the  world market depends on the  poli- 
cies of their  own governments. 
Governments face major dilemmas in meeting the  food 
needs of the  poor. Low prices t o  benefit consumers may ac t  as 
a disincentive to  farmers producing food for t he  market. 
Higher prices may accelerate economic growth and generate 
employment opportunities for t h e  poor, but this is a long-term 
consequence. The immediate effect of higher prices is more 
hunger among the  poor who purchase all o r  par t  of their  food 
from t h e  market. Government food subsidies help to  alleviate 
hunger, but leave fewer resources for investment and thus may 
cut into economic growth. What should be t h e  allocation of 
I-esources between growth-promoting investments and redis tri- 
butive policies? What price policies should governments then 
adopt and how much attention should they pay to  signals from a 
distorted world market? 
The Basic Linked System (BLS) of national policy models 
was constructed to  explore answers to  these types of questions 
(see Box 1). The effects of various policy options need to  be  
tested with an empirically estimated model and their  effective- 
ness assessed in t e r m s  of t he  usual multiplicity of national 
objectives. 
- 
PERSISTENT H UNGEH 
Freedom from hunger is perhaps the  most fundamental human 
right embodied in t he  UN Charter. All signatories to  t h e  Char- 
ter, i.e., virtually every nation in t he  world, thus accept the  
right of all people to  sufficient food. Yet widespread hunget- 
still persists. Actual numbers a re  difficult to  establish, 
because terms like hunger, starvation, and undernourishment 
a r e  not precisely quantified. Most attempts a t  measurement 
suggest that ,  although the number of hungry people has 
increased over t he  past two decades, the  incrc?ase was less 
than the  ra te  of population growth of the  developing countl-ies. 
However, the  problem is still sizeable artd large numbers of 
people live with barely sufficient food - the  slightest economic 
shock car1 send them back t o  chronic undernourishment. 
Significant progress has been made in reducing poverty 
and hunger. In developing countries, life expectancy (at birth) 
has increased from less than 40 years t o  around 55 years over 
the  past th ree  decades. The abundance of food wc~r'ldwidp: arltl 
the  progress made through national and international efforts in 
coping with acute shortages make the  question more pertinent : 
Why has more progress not been made in reducing chronic 
hunger? 
Famines a r e  the  most spect,acular form tha t  hunger takes 
and, in most cases, indicate a failure of national governments. 
The existence of chronic hunger indicates a failure of t he  
Box 2 
HOWMANYHUNGRYAND WHEREARETHEY? 
Widely di f ferent  estimates exis t .  World Bank estimates, o n  t h e  
basis of ca lo r ie  in take norms established jointly by t h e  FA0 and 
WHO, suggest  t h a t  in 1970 around 660 million persons  remained 
below 90X of t h e  food norm, and almost half of these  did not 
even r e a c h  80X. By 1980, t h e  number of pe rsons  below 90% of 
t h e  food norm had increased to 730 million, while t h a t  below 80X 
remained at slightly l e ss  than half t h a t  number. The bulk of t h e  
hungry are in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (FYgure 1 ) .  
In t h e  r e f e r e n c e  scenar io ,  with basically unchanged poli- 
c i e s  worldwide, t h e  number of hungry continues to r i s e  through 
1990, t h e r e a f t e r  s t a r t ing  a slow decline ( f i g u r e  2). 
( a )  < 90% of norm (b )  < 80% of norm 
Middle East and 
Latin America 
1970 1980 1970 1980 
Year 
f i g u r e  1. Population with ca lo r ie  deficiency, 1970 and 1980 
(based on World Bank estimates). 
(cont. ) 
political and social system, but in a far less dramatic fashion. 
The steps needed to prevent death from famine are  obvious; 
those needed to prevent chronic hunger a re  less so. 
The FAP study shows that the level of hunger will persist 
if previous economic trends are  extended into the future and if 
the continuation of present policies is assumed. By the end of 
the century the number of hungry people will be the same as 
today (see Box 2). On the positive side, this will be a smaller 
proportion of the world population; more people will be 
BOX 2 (cant . )  
140 
120- 
X 100 
0, 
-0 
C 
- 
80 - 
60 - 
40 
u 
1 I I I 
1970 1980 1990 2000 
Year 
f i g u r e  2. Index of number of hungry in t h e  r e f e r e n c e  s c e n a r i o  
(1970 FA0 estimate = 100). 
This s c e n a r i o  implies t h a t  by t h e  end of th i s  cen tu ry  11.X 
of t h e  population in t h e  developing countr ies ,  excluding China, 
will remain chronically undernourished.  Still ,  t h e  volume of 
food needed to r a i s e  t h e  level  of food in take  of all people to t h e  
accep ted  minimum i s  not large:  in terms of food g ra ins ,  t h e  
def ic i t  amounts to some 50 million tons  or about  3% of world 
c e r e a l s  output.  The problem of hunger  i s  c l ea r ly  not  one of t h e  
inadequate availabil i ty of food, but  one of how to inc rease  t h e  
abil i ty of t h e  hungry to obtain more food. 
productively employed. Flowever, increases in food prices will  
rcduce the purchasing power of these incomes. F'ood pric:es 
will rise because the scope for expansion of cultivable land is 
limited, and production increases car1 only c:ome f r ~ c ~ r n  t ho  
increased use of purchased inputs that raise the cost of pro- 
duction. 
MARKET SOL U TIONS 
The various scenarios t h a t  deal with al ternative international 
measures t o  change t h e  mechanisms of t h e  world food system 
clearly illustrate t h e  problem. Any a t tempt  t o  opera te  through 
national and world food markets fails for  t h e  simple reason 
tha t ,  lacking purchasing power, t h e  hungry a r e  only marginal 
part icipants  in those markets. Attempts t o  reach them 
through t h e  markets leads t o  adjustments elsewhere, and in t h e  
new equilibrium t h e  poor usually remain as badly off as  before. 
In s h o r t ,  t h e  market mechanism c rea tes  a world food sys- 
t e m  t h a t  is reslient for  t h e  r ich,  but  in t rac table  for  t h e  starv-  
ing. Chronic hunger is a s tubbornly pers is tent  fea ture  of a 
market-oriented food system. 
- 
FOOD SUPPLY INCREASES 
GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY INCREASES 
Policy interventions specifically designed t o  improve global 
food supplies do not increase adequately t he  food consumed by 
t h e  poor. The system adjusts t o  provide food a t  reasonable 
cost t o  those who have the  money to  buy it,  but does not 
increase adequately t he  food consumed by t h e  hungry. This 
finding applies t o  a number of popular notions about t he  ways 
to  improve food intake of the  poor, as demonstrated by a set of 
scenarios that  increase agricultural supplies in the  world 
market. These include scenarios tha t  assume: 
(1)Increased production in the  developed countries, thus let - 
ting farmers in those countries take care  of t h e  hungry. 
(2)Reduced waste and overconsumption (the rich have one meal 
less). 
(3)Reduced meat consumption to  save on food grains and so 
increase the  availability of cereals for human consumption. 
Why a r e  measures to  increase global supplies not effec- 
t ive? Model simulations show (see Box 3) that:  
Box 3 
THE MARKET IS RESIIJIENT 
How l i t t l e  i s  ach i eved  by market-or.ient.ed pol ic ies  in t e r m s  of 
r e a c h i n g  t h e  hungry  i s  e x p r e s s e d  by  t h e  numbers  obta ined  f rom 
s c e n a r i o s  t h a t  change  supp l i e s  and  p r i c e s  (l'abte 2) .  
Table 1. S c e n a r i o s  t h a t  c h a n g e  supp l i e s  a n d  p r i c e s .  
--- 
-. . 
Persons Hungry 
Scenarios  IS90 2000 
(I) R e f e r e n c e  (millions of p e r s o n s )  470 400 
Per-c:ent.age change  over- 
r e f e r e n c e  s c e n a r i o  
(2) Highe r  supp ly  on  t h e  
world marke t :  
50 million tons  more  wheat  
on  t h e  world m a r k e t  -3 - Z 
50% l e s s  meat  consumption 
in t h e  OECD c o u r ~ t r i e s  -7 -1 
(3) B e t t e r  p r o d u c e r  p r i c e s  in 
developing c o u n t r i e s :  
25% l e s s  product ion  in OECD 
c o u n t r i e s  +11 +Y 
Agricul tura l  t r a d e  l ibera l iza t ion :  
By all  m a r k e t  economies  +I +. 1 
By developing c o u n t r i e s  -5 -5 
By OECD cour i t r ies  +3  +/I 
Obviously, t h e  m a r k e t  mechanism is s t u b b o r n  in ad jus t ing  
to t h e  needs  of the hungry .  T r a d e  1iheralixat.ior1 b y  Lhe 0h;CI.) 
c o u n t r i e s  a p p e a r s  even  to add  to t h e  number  of hungry .  
L,iberalization b y  t h e  developing c o u n t r i e s  r .educes t.he r ~ u m b c r ,  
b u t  t h i s  e f f e c t  i s  ove rcompensa t ed  f o r  by  t h e  negat ive  e f f e c t s  
of OE;CD l ibera l iza t ion  if bo th  c o u n t r y  g ~ - o u p s  w e r e  to un t l c r t ake  
t h e  removal  of b o r d e r  p r o t e c t i o n  jointly. 
(1) Additional food supplies on t h e  world market a r e  absorbed 
through adjustments in t h e  behavior of producers,  con- 
sumers, and governments endowed with purchasing power; 
t h e  hungry do  not improve t h e i r  incomes and consequently 
do  not e a t  more food. 
(2) Consumption reductions in t h e  r ich  countr ies  lead t o  
adjustments in prices,  t r ade ,  and  production, which 
together  nullify any additional food supplies t o  t h e  poor. 
DOMESTIC FOOD SUPPLY INCREASES 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
If increasing t h e  global supply of food is not effective, will t h e  
situation improve when domestic supplies in t h e  developing 
countr ies  a r e  raised? 
In this  respect, one can consider  producer  pr ice  
increases t o  farmers,  thus  providing incentives t o  produce 
more, a s  is recommended widely. Relatively low prices paid t o  
farmers have been singled out in many countr ies  as a major rea- 
son fo r  unsat isfactory production. Higher prices can  b e  
obtained direct ly,  by offering h igher  government intervention 
prices;  t h e y  can b e  obtained indirect ly by  measures t h a t  raise 
world market prices.  Among t h e  l a t t e r  is t h e  suggestion tha t  
protect ion should be  removed, forcing developed countr ies  t o  
reduce  surpluses and developing countr ies  t o  set internal  
pr ices  in accordance with world market  prices.  Beyond this,  
policies t o  r educe  agricultural production in t h e  developed 
countr ies  even f u r t h e r  may be  justified fo r  environmental rea- 
sons. 
Again, in t h e s e  cases t h e  resul t s  of additional incentives 
t o  farmers in developing countr ies  a r e  disappointing o r  even 
negative (see Box 3). Simulations show that :  
(1) Production in t h e  developing countr ies  is, indeed, raised,  
bu t  pa r t ly  t o  give additional expor t s ,  whereas consumers 
a r e  worse off due  t o  higher prices.  
(2) Trade liberalization in the industrial countries only has 
negligible effects on the poor. 
(3) Trade liberalization by the developing countries has 
larger beneficial effects, though they are still marginal. 
This is not surprising, since poverty and hunger relate to 
limited resource endowments, which are not effectively 
changed by price policies alone. Price policies may, in fact, 
increase the value of the resources not in the hands of the 
poor relative to those - mainly labor - that they do have. 
NONMARKET MEASURES BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Why cannot  developing count r ies  deal  with t h e  hunger. problem 
themselves? Subsidized food ra t ions ,  ru ra l  works programs, o r  
o t h e r  schemes t o  benef i t  unemployed labor. cart give t h e  poor. 
more income a n d  b e t t e r  acces s  t o  food marke ts .  
I t  is  obvious t h a t  t h e  prsoblem is t h e  constr.aint on 
resources .  Both f inance a n d  managerial abi l i ty  a r e  s c a r c e  
resources ,  a n d  t h e i r  diversion t o  progr-ams t h a t  alleviatt: 
pove r ty  r e t a r d s  t h e  overall  economic growth. Rxplor-at ions 
with some national models of developing count r ies  show that. 
t h e  trade-off between growth and  redis tr ibut ion is significant.  
Redistr ibut ion t h a t  car] significantly r e d u c e  hunger  would 
resu l t  in a d r a s t i c  fall in growth,  and  is unlikely t o  b e  politi- 
cally accep tab le  in t h e  developing count r ies .  
NONMARKET MEASURES WITH EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE 
The  n e x t  question i s  whe the r  intervent ions t o  meet t h e  food 
needs  of t h e  poor  can  b e  f inanced from e x t e r n a l  resources .  
How much additional aid is required? The emphasis is on aid,  
not on commercial cap i ta l  flows, a s  t h e  l a t t e r  follow opportuni-  
t i e s  f o r  economic: a n d  financial r e t u r n s ,  which t h e  poorsest 
count r ies  hard ly  a p p e a r  t o  of fe r .  Thus t h e  question is: How 
much aid should be given to finance nonmarket interventions in 
the food and labor markets for the benefit of the hungry? 
The analysis provides the following results (see Box 4): 
(1) Additional aid, equivalent to 0.5% of the GDP of the richer 
countries, given in inverse proportion to per  capita 
incomes, but not specifically tied to spending on behalf of 
the poorest groups, will reduce the number of hungry by 
32% in the year 2000. 
(2) If additional aid is solely dedicated to investment, there is 
initially only a small reduction in hunger, but by the year 
2000 the number reaches the same level as in (I), namely 
32% fewer hungry people. This reduction in hunger per- 
sists even if aid is discontinued after  15  years. 
(3) When additional aid is given, as in the first case, without 
being tied to specific spending, hunger is immediately 
reduced but is very sensitive to the discontinuation of 
aid. 
(4) If additional aid can be fully used for meeting the food 
needs of the poor, with additional aid a t  half the levels in 
the other scenarios, eradication of hunger is possible 
before 2000 without reducing economic growth. 
In summary: a combination of targeted aid and targeted 
food programs can eradicate hunger a t  small financial cost and 
without reducing overall economic progress in the developing 
countries. 
How realistic are these findings? From a purely economic 
viewpoint there is little doubt that the estimates indicate well 
the orders of magnitude. Raising food intake of the poor above 
some minimum is a small problem in terms of the quantities of 
food concerned and the financial costs, particularly when com- 
pared with global food and financial resources. One should 
therefore expect to need rather small additional resources 
when a targeted nonmarket approach is taken (see Box 5). This 
raises other issues of a noneconomic kind and questions as to 
the efficiency with which such programs can be implemented. 
Poor Asian countries may, in this respect, be better equipped 
to administer such programs than the poor countries of Africa. 
Still, it appears that additional aid, equivalent to 0.3% of the 
Box 4 
AID SCENARIOS 
Suppose that  all  the  r ich countries add 0.5% of the i r  GDP t o  
t he i r  aid budgets - above the present  0.35% - and that  this 
additional aid is distributed inversely t o  the p e r  capita incomes 
of the recipient countries. Suppose, fur ther ,  that  this aid is  
e i t he r  added entirely t o  savings and investment (A-Cap 
scenario,  Table 2)  or given a s  balance-of-payments support  (A- 
Bop scenario,  Table 2) t o  which the  marginal expenditure pro- 
pensities of the  recipient country apply. Hunger is  then 
reduced significantly. 
Table 2. Addition of 0.5% of GDP to aid budgets: results in 2000. 
- 
H u n g r y  Percent  change  o v e r  
p e r s o n s ,  reference  s c e n a r i o  
reference  
C o u n t r y  g r o u p s  s c e n a r i o  (lo6) A-Cap A-Bop 
All developing countriesa 400 -32 -32 
Middle income 30 0 +4 
Laow-middle income 60 -13 -8 
Low incomea 310 -4 0 -40 
of which India 155 -54 -56 
a~xc lud ing  China. 
Even without any redistributive policies in the  developing 
countries the effect on hunger is  sizeable. India shows very 
large reductions because of i ts  low p e r  capi ta  income and 
therefore  relatively large s h a r e  of aid receipts .  
Aid f o r  development has  not been a very popular topic in 
past years ,  when the need to contain government expenditures 
has  dominated policies in developed market economies. Uneasi- 
ness about the effectiveness of aid adds to the  reluctance to 
expand it. The scenario presented h e r e  may, f o r  these reasons,  
s e e m  naive and too f a r  from political realities. I t  should, how- 
eve r ,  be considered in conjunction with o ther  policies tha t  gen- 
e r a t e  o r  free resources: t rade  liberalization can provide addi- 
tional resources.  FAP has also explored scenarios in which 
arms expenditures are reduced. 
Box 5 
AID WITH REDISTRIBUTION I N  INDIA 
Massive r u r a l  works programs can  r a i s e  t h e  income of t h e  poor  
in India t o  levels sufficient f o r  them t o  purchase  adequate  food. 
Tn t l ~ c  detailed India model, 100 kg of wheat p e r  person-year i s  
assumed t o  be distr ibuted t o  a l l  t h e  poor  from 1900 onward. 
Complementary costs of administration and  inputs arc included 
and t h e  extreme assumption is  made t h a t  t h e  program creat,os 
no productive assets. 
Without e x t r a  aid,  th is  r e t a r d s  growth t.o a n  unacceptably 
low level. With a id  t o  maintain growth in t h e  r e f e r e n c e  
scenar io ,  India remains dependent on substant,inl ndditior~al aid 
flows t o  sustain t h e  program. The most a t t r a c t i v e  option is  t o  
start with additional aid in t h e  e a r l y  y e a r s  t o  r a i s e  economic 
growth t o  a higher  level, which then permits termination of t h e  
e x t r a  a id  in t h e  l a te  1990s without disrupting t h e  financing of 
t h e  r u r a l  works programs (Table 3). 
Table 3. The e f fec t  of a id  on p e r  cap i ta  income, cos t  of r u r a l  
works programs, and t r a d e  defici t  changes  (in 1970 U S  $ X lo9, 
e x c e p t  p e r  capi ta  income, which is  in 1970 U S  $). 
Scenar io  
Aid to More a i d ,  
Without; m a i n t a i n  t e r m i n a t e d  
Year e x t r a  a i d  g r o w t h  b y  7996  
P e r  cap i ta  income 1985 111 117' 121 
2000 155 182' 195 
Cost of r u r a l  1985 3.6 3.6 3.6 
works programs 2000 3.2 3.1 3.1 
Change in t r a d e  3 985 -0.1 5.4 9.6 
deficit  (=aid) from 2000 -0.4 3.9 0 
t h e  r e f e r e n c e  r u n  
a Equal to t h e  r e f e r e n c e  sconarlo.  
Note tha t  in t h e  a id  scenar ios  presented e a r l i e r ,  India 
rece ives  14 billion U S  dol lars  of additional aid,  but t h e  lower 
amount (shown in t h e  las t  column of Table 3, being t a rge ted ,  
goes  much f u r t h e r  in reducing hunger.  
developed countries' GDP and designed to reach the poor, 
could eradicate hunger even if one third of it does not reach 
the poor and instead is added to the income gr-owth of the not- 
so-poor. 
AID-GIVERS BENEFIT 
Countries receiving aid will use the foreign exchange to buy 
more imports, a large part of which will be obtained from the 
aid-giving countries. The positive effects on the growth of the 
developed countries are significant. To put these into per- 
spec tive: 
(1) When the developed market-economy countries liberalize 
their trade - which has negligible impact on hunger - 
they register a GDP increase of 0.48% above the reference 
scenario in the year 2000. 
(2) When all the market-economy countries, developed and 
developing, liberalize their agricultural trade and the 
developed countries provide an additional 0.5% of their 
GDP as aid to - the poor countries, the GDP of the 
developed market economies as a group rises by 0.75% 
above the reference scenario in the year 2000. 
Two things follow from these findings. Not only does the 
combination of free trade with additional aid enhance the 
growth of industrial economies, bri t it allows them to recapture 
more than half of the additional aid. But for the hungry the 
combination is less desirable, since their number is reduced by 
only 27% as compared with 32% in the case of additional aid 
only. Higher food prices through trade liberalization are the 
main reason for this effect. However, it has already been 
shown that the effectiveness of aid in reducing hunger is con- 
siderably enhanced when combined with redistributive policies 
in the developing countries. In this setting, the amounts of 
additional aid suggested here are found to be adequate to erad- 
icate hunger. This remains the case when trade liberalization 
is pursued at the same time. 
- 
C,'ONSTRAINTS ON MORII,ITY AND THE CASE FOR A ID 
Compared with the migration opportunities for surplus labor in  
Europe in the nineteenth century and the early part of the 
twentieth, the international movement of labor is a marginal 
feature of today's world. There is no d o ~ ~ b t  that this opt.ion, if 
it were available to the people in developing countries, would 
result in large migration flows today. 
Nor- can it be doubted - and estimates with the model sys- 
tem confirm - that these movements could lead to substantial 
gains in world income. The protection of labor markets by 
national governments is a major means of maintaining large 
income disparities between developed and developing coun- 
tries. But they have other uses as well. They preserve 
national cultures and identities and preclude social tensions 
that might result from large labor movements. It would be quite 
unrealistic to assume that restrictions on the movement of 
labor will be reduced significantly. 
Neoclassical economists have traditionally argued that, in 
a world where labor and capital are the only two factors of pro- 
duction, free trade of commodities would equalize wages among 
countries without any movement of labor. TJnfortunately, how- 
ever, in the real world countries have locational advantages 
and limited access to nonrenewable resources, such as land, 
which contribute to production. In such a world free trade 
does not equalize wages; nor does free movement. of capital. 
Capital services will, if they move freely, simply not go to 
coun t r i e s  with limited land resources .  Thus, unless one  has  
miraculous developments in t h e  field of t r anspor t a t ion ,  s o  t h a t  
locational advantages lose t h e i r  importance,  free t r a d e  can  
reduce inequality in wages, bu t  cannot  equalize them without 
allowing people t o  work abroad  and ,  possibly, r e p a t r i a t e  t h e i r  
earnings.  
In economic te rms ,  t h e r e  is a pu rpose  s e r v e d  in calculat- 
ing those  incomes foregone through maintaining fences  a round 
labor  marke ts ;  in o t h e r  words, t o  es t imate  t h e  r e n t s  of t h e  
f ences ,  who is earn ing  t h e s e  r e n t s ,  a n d  who i s  most h u r t  b y  
them. On th i s  basis,  one  can  justify subs tan t ia l  compensation 
payments  from r e n t  e a r n e r s  in developed count r ies  t o  income 
losers  in developing ones.  
The  findings suggest  t h a t  t h i s  argument  can. even u n d e r  
r e s t r i c t i ve  a n d  conservat ive assumptions, justify aid flows t h a t  
a r e  g r e a t e r  t han  t h e  c u r r e n t  ones and ,  even ,  t han  t h e  h igher  
ones  proposed  in t h e  preceding  analysis.  They  t h e r e f o r e  
s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  argument f o r  aid t o  e r ad ica t e  hunger  a n d  even 
justify aid a t  a level adequate  enough t o  achieve  full employ- 
ment in developing count r ies  within one  generat ion.  
The preceding chapters occasionally referred to agricultural 
trade policies and some brief statements were made about the 
limited impact of market-oriented policies - including trade 
liberalization - or1 the hunger problem. These effects were 
invariably found to be small. It would, however, be incorrect to 
conclude from this passing treatment that trade issues a re  not 
important for developing and developed countries. An 
improved trade climate could provide additional resources to 
the developing countries and thus reduce the need for aid. 
These resources could in turn be used, as with aid, to support 
domestic programs designed to reduce hunger. Therefore, it is 
important to quantify the benefits from changes in trade 
regimes and to look a t  their distribution by countries. 
The question becomes even more pertinent when a survey 
is made of current agricultural production and trade policies, 
and of existing distortions and dislocations. In a number of 
respects, the trade issues are  a mirror image of the hunger 
problem discussed in the preceding chapters. 
Instead of one well-functioning food system, there appear 
to be two loosely connected malfunctioning ones (see Box 6). 
How can these systems be integrated? 
It has already been noted that governments in developing 
countries face difficult dilemmas in deciding on appropriate 
price policies to stimulate food production and maintain stable, 
preferably low, prices for poor consumers. Governments in 
developed countries face similar difficult decisions. Although 
Box 6 
Table 4. Two aspec t s  of global food systems. 
Hunger Food S u r p l u s e s  
On t h e  margin of the  economic Created by t h e  economic 
system system 
Lack of effective demand Saturat ion of food demand 
Lack of appropr ia te  food Little control  of 
production technology technological t r ends  
Liberal  t r a d e  not of much Liberal  t r a d e  c a n  reduce  
help  surpluses  
Dependent on world markets  Determining world markets  
Inadequate resources  f o r  Abundant r e s o u r c e s  t o  
government policies to p r o t e c t  farm incomes thus  
eliminate hunger causing surpluses  
External  assistance essential  Resources  permit  aggress ive  
e x p o r t  policies 
the  majority of their  consumers can afford high food prices, 
t he  governments a r e  called upon to  give income guarantees to  
farmers whose incomes a r e  unstable, because of supply fluctua- 
tions, and relatively low when compared with those in the  
nonagricultural sector.  When these guarantees a r e  provided 
by setting minimum prices, the  result is a tendency to  move up 
o r  away from prevailing world market prices while improving 
farm incomes. 
High prices a r e  mainly passed on to  domestic consumers 
and make new investments and the  application of new technolo- 
gies more attractive than world prices warrant. A process is 
thus set in motion in which technological innovation attains a 
momentum of i ts  own, in turn requiring price policies that  main- 
tain t he  rates of return.  
Surpluses a r e  disposed of with subsidies on domestic 
markets or on the  international market. Price competition 
then reduces the  market share  of other  exporters ,  even if 
they a r e  efficient producers, unless they a r e  willing to  engage 
also in subsidy competition. This lowers the  export  earnings, 
farm incomes, and public resources of developing countries 
that export competing products. Retaliatory measures have 
led to frictions and further distortions of world prices. 
Quite a few developing countries, on the other hand, are 
benefiting from this situation, at least in terms of their balance 
of payments. For example, their food import costs are kept 
artificially low by the subsidized disposal of surplus cereals on 
the world market. This, however, might be a short-term gain. 
Low prices are a disincentive to their own producers and lead, 
in the long run, to an unsustainable dependence on imports, as 
appears to be the case in large parts of Africa. 
Also, some developing countries have found outlets for 
new exports that would not have arisen in a less distorted 
situation. High food-grain prices in the EC have attracted 
large trade flows of grain substitutes. An example is cassava 
from Thailand, which is not covered by the EC's border protec- 
t ion of f ood-grains and is t heref ore competitively priced. But 
these advantages carry considerable risk, since they are 
dependent on the whim of agricultural policy administrators in 
industrial countries. Also, these benefits may not offset the 
loss of markets and the negative effects of very low world 
prices. An example of the latter case is the sugar market, 
which is important to a large number of developing countries. 
Against this background it is important to assess the 
consequences of agricultural trade liberalization, which should 
increase efficiency at the global level as countries adjust their 
production to be more in line with their comparative advan- 
tages. However, in the absence of compensating transfers some 
countries may lose under liberalization. An assessment of eff i- 
ciency gains at  the global level and the gains and losses of indi- 
vidual countries can provide some insight into the degree to 
which each country's production and trade has become dis- 
torted and how large the adjustment costs may be. Several 
scenarios are relevant to this analysis: What if the developed 
market economies remove border protection? But also: What 
consequences can be expected from the removal of border pro- 
tection by developing countries alone? This is an issue that 
can be usefully analyzed, since it belongs to the regular pack- 
age of adjustment policies recommended by the World Bank and 
the IMF. Simultaneous liberalization by all market economies is 
an obvious third option to be considered. 
LIBERALIZATION BY DEVELOPED MARKET ECONOMIES 
A move toward agricultural t rade  liberalization by countries 
with developed market economies would raise, by t h e  year 
2000, world agricultural prices t o  about 9% above those of t h e  
re fe rence  scenario. Prices of products tha t  a r e  important t o  
developing countries' food imports would rise significantly and 
expor t  prices would lag, causing a significant terms-of-trade 
loss for  t h e  developing countries. The total world production 
changes only marginally, but i t  is reallocated be tween coun- 
tr ies,  together with substantial changes in t h e  pat tern  of t rade  
(see Box 7) .  The GDP of t h e  developing countries falls slightly, 
suggesting tha t  a s  a group they  a r e  current ly  marginal benefi- 
ciaries of t h e  prevailing protectionist policies of developed 
market economies. 
A closer look a t  t h e  developing countries suggests t ha t  
this scenario leads t o  significant losses for a number of them. 
Higher cereal  prices reduce their  capacity t o  import and mar- 
ginally increase t h e  level of hunger in t he  world. Egypt, a 
large wheat importer, obviously loses; but so  also do Brazil and 
Turkey. Argentina and Kenya gain, and Thailand gains margi- 
nally; they  a r e  agricultural surplus countries and benefit from 
improvements in terms of trade.  In all, t h e r e  seems little rea- 
son for  developing countries a s  a group t o  press  fo r  overall 
agricultural t rade  liberalization by t h e  developed market 
economies. Their interests may be more directly served by 
focusing on specific commodities whose prices a r e  depressed 
Box 7 
TRADE SHIFTS BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL CO'UNTRIES 
Whereas the  USA claims tha t  EC policies remove a s h a r e  of the  
global wheat market, Canada could claim tha t  U S  policies 
deprive Canadian producers  of potential dairy exports  ( f igure  
3). 
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Figure 3. Market sha re s  in 2000. Column (1) is  the re fe rence  
scenario and column (2)  the  OECD t rade  llberalizatlon scenario.  
U S  farmers  roughly maintain t he i r  incomes; in the  EC, 
farm incomes are reduced by only 8% due to high world market 
pr ices ,  res t ructur ing of production pat terns ,  and somewhat 
l a rge r  movement of labor  out of agriculture.  Total GDP galns 
exceed farm income losses. 
due t o  surplus production in t h e  developed countries. Though 
t h e  developing countries lose, agricultural t r ade  liberalization 
by t h e  developed market economies is beneficial t o  themselves 
(see Box 8). 
Box 8 
GAINS FOR DEVEIJOPED MARKET ECONOMIES FROM 
ACRICULITURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
When t h e  developed market  economies (OECD countr ies)  l iberal-  
ize agr icu l tu ra l  t r a d e ,  t h e i r  GDP in t h e  y e a r  2000 improves by 
almost 0.5%, and t h e  world GDP inc reases  by 0.25%, but tha t  of 
developing countr ies  Palls slightly. 
Though t h e  inc rease  in global GDP, measured at 1970 
world p r i ces ,  i s  small in pe rcen tage  terms i t  s t i l l  arnounts to 30 
billion US 8 at 1970 p r ices ,  and is  l a r g e r  than t h e  level  of aid 
given to developing countr ies  today. A s  a percen tage  of the  
GDP for t h e  agr icul tura l  s e c t o r  of OECD countr ies ,  from which 
distort ions have been removed, t h e  global gain i s  more than 
20%. 
Income P a r i t y  Falls - But Modestly 
US f a r m e r s  as a group  maintain t h e i r  income despi te  removal of 
protect ion.  The EC fa rmers  a s  a group,  who at preseri t  r ece ive  
around 40% of t h e i r  iricome from protect ion,  would lose income. 
However, the  loss in t h e i r  income is  r.elatively small. I l igher 
world p r i ces  and the  res t ruc tu r ing  of production pa t t e rns  in 
t h e  EC account  for the  small loss in farm incomes. The loss in 
farm income is  much smaller  than the  gain in GDP of the  EC, s o  
tha t  even a f t e r  f u r t h e r  compensation payments t o  f a rmers  the  
EC would gain (similar i s  the  c a s e  f o r  f a r m  incomes and GDP 
gains in Japan).  Income par i ty  in the  EC falls  by only 4X as 
l a b o r  migrates out  of ag r icu l tu re  (Table 5 ) .  Though this  l abor  
i s  productively absorbed in the  nc)nagricultural s e c t o r  in these  
scenar ios ,  the  social  and political problems of increased l abor  
migration need t o  be  recognized. 
Since agr icul tura l  t r a d e  l iberalization by t h e  OECD coun- 
t r i e s  is  beneficial to both the  EC and t h c  lJSA,  sholild not these  
coun t r i e s  l iberalize unilateral ly? Though unilateral  t r a d e  lib- 
eralization by e i t h e r  the  EC o r  tha  IJSA benefi ts  consumers in 
the  country  liberalizing, i t  r educes  farm incomes much more 
than in a simultaneous move by a l l  OECD count.ries. A simult.an<:- 
o u s  move would involve smaller  adjustment problems f o r  OECD 
f a r m e r s  artd thus more easi ly perrnit a l ternat ive  nondistortine 
mechanisms to p r o t e c t  farmers '  incomes. 
( c o n t . )  
BOX 8 ( c o n t . )  
Table 5. Impact in the year 2000 of agricultural trade liberal- 
ization by OECD. 
A g r i c u  L- 
Re la t i ve  t u r a l  
Degree of p r i c e  of produc-  Agricul -  
p ro tec t ion  a g r i c u l -  t i o n  t u r a l  Income 
in refer-  t u r e  vo lume  labor  paritya 
Coun-  ence 
t r y  s c e n a r i o  ( X  change over reference scenario) 
EC 23 -9 -8 -12 - 4 
Japan 82 -35 1 -5 -35 
USA 14 -2 2 - 0 
a Agriculture/nonagriculture. 
LIBERALIZATION BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
When only developing countries alone (excluding China) liberal- 
ize agricultural trade,  most of them appear to  become be t te r  
off. Also, t h e  level of hunger in t h e  world is reduced somewhat, 
but t he re  a r e  a f e w  developing countries who lose. Among 
these a r e  some agr-icultural exporting courltries - world market 
prices for their  products decline in relative terms. These 
negative price effects a r e  not offset by increases in exports 
voli~me as long as t h e  industrial countries maintain their  pro- 
tcct,ivc stance. Others lose because rigidities in t he  movement 
of labor and capital between sectors lead to  a less efficient use 
of productior~ factors under liberalization. But many other  
countries appear to  gain, despite terms-of-trade losses anti 
larger deficits in their  agricultural t rade balance. 
Trade effects, even if significantly negative, thus appear 
to  be overcompensated for by adjustments in pr-oduction and 
consumption that  a r e  more aligned to  t he  prevailing world 
market. prices and to  a comparative advantage a t  those prices. 
From t h e  preceding discussion of t he  removal of protective 
bar r i e r s  in t h e  developed market economies, i t  should b e  
recalled t h a t  those world market pr ices  remain seriously dis- 
tor ted .  The gains registered in this scenario can the re fo re  
easily b e  undone when t h e  developed countries also liberalize. 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION BY ALL MARKET 
ECONOMIES 
The level of hunger in t h e  world hardly changes in th is  
scenario, s ince  food becomes more expensive. Many developing 
countries thus  lose, including some countries who gain when 
only developing countries liberalize. As in t h e  case of liberal- 
ization by  t h e  developed market economies - t o  which this  
scenar io  is r a t h e r  akin - agricultural e x p o r t e r s  tend t o  gain. 
The mix of results ,  and t h e  apparen t  inability of some develop- 
ing countries t o  make full use of opportunities for  t r ade  expan- 
sion in a more liberal environment, do  not make th is  a major 
option for  developing countries. However, t h e  gains t o  
developed market economies from t r a d e  liberalization are 
greater than from liberalization by  themselves alone. 
Though a number of t h e  developing countries who gain 
when only t h e  developing countries liberalize actually lose in 
th is  scenario, t h e i r  losses are smaller than when t h e  developed 
market economies alone liberalize t h e i r  agricultural t rade .  
Thus, f o r  these  developing countries agricultural t r a d e  liberal- 
ization is still  a desirable policy. 
- 
CONCLUSIONS 
The scenarios described in Chapter 3.0 show that agricultural 
trade liberalization does, indeed, lead to efficiency gains at  the 
global level; however, the gain amounts to less than 0.3% of the 
global GDP. Also, the direct impact of agr.icultura1 trade 
liberalization on hunger is marginal with changes of less than 
5% in the number of hungry people; nor does it lead to much 
larger foreign exchange earnings from agricultural trade. 
When only the developing countries liberalize agricultural 
trade, their agricultural trade balances deteriorate by 16X; 
the alternative of developed country liberalization more than 
doubles the agricultural trade balance of developing countries, 
the increase amounting to some 7 billion US $ in current prices. 
The increase is lower but comparable when all countries 
liberalize. These are significant amounts, but still relatively 
small when compared. with the resources needed to finance the 
eradication of hunger. And only a part of the additional 
foreign exchange earnings can be transformed into savings or 
government income that can be used to help the poor. 
As pointed out earlier, if agricultural trade is liberalized 
by the market economy countries while additional aid is given 
to developing countries, i.e., if instead of protecting domestic 
farmers, the developed countries were to use their resources 
to give aid to poor countries, both will be better off. Hunger 
will be reduced (or eliminated if poor countries also redistri- 
bute in ternally), consumers in some of the developed countries 
will gain, the income in developed market economies as a group 
will increase (even after accounting for additional aid as well as 
transfers to farmers to protect their incomes), and the prob- 
lem of surplus milk and butter mountains will disappear. The 
world will then move from its current paradoxical state of 
hunger in abundance to a more sensible state of abundance 
without hunger. 
What is often not done, and what has been done here, is to 
assess quantitatively the size of all the efforts combined that 
are needed to virtually eliminate chronic hunger in the world 
by the turn of the century. If the magnitude of the required 
efforts is considered infeasible, even when it has been 
sweetened by suggesting ways to raise the needed resources a t  
no cost, then one might as well give up and accept that the 
world will live with chronic hunger for a long time to come. 
The sweeping changes in policies that are analyzed and 
presented here are not chosen because the authors think that 
these can be easily adopted and implemented. Moving toward 
the set of policies described here will, in any case, be a diffi- 
cult process, since considerable reluctance and resistance will 
have to be overcome. The contribution of this analysis is that 
it shows how effective measures can be taken and that the 
benefits can exceed the costs, the' latter being considerably 
less than often is presumed. If the discussion of policy 
changes is made to move again toward actual measures to be 
taken, then the analysis has served its purpose. 
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